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Abstract
Crull (2014) claims that by invoking decoherence it is possible (i) to
obviate many “fine grained” issues often conflated under the common des-
ignation of measurement problem, and (ii) to make substantial progresses
in the fields of quantum gravity and quantum cosmology, without any early
incorporation of a particular interpretation in the quantum formalism. We
point out that Crull is mistaken about decoherence and tacitly assumes some
kind of interpretation of the quantum formalism.
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In the article “Less Interpretation and More Decoherence in Quantum Grav-
ity and Inflationary Cosmology”, Elise Crull praises the virtues of decoherence in
addressing many conceptual problems in quantum physics – including the fields
of quantum gravity and quantum cosmology, and argues that decoherence does
such a good job alone, that is, without drawing from the outset upon any inter-
pretational work. While we agree with the author that decoherence is a powerful
tool that effectively helps us dealing with the conceptual asperities of quantum
physics – the measurement problem above all –, we do not see how this fact might
dispense us with the urge to interpret the bare quantum formalism.
Let us start from what, in our opinion, represents the apple of discord here: the no-
tion of interpretation. What does Crull intend by this word? In the paper, she does
not give a straightforward definition of what interpretation is to her. Presumably,
she considers de Broglie-Bohm and Everett approaches, plus collapse theories,
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as instances of interpretation. This set of choices is rather heterogeneous, rang-
ing from frameworks that simply add some extra-physical assumption on top of
the quantum formalism (e.g. the existence of many worlds or many minds), to
approaches that modify (or supplement) the usual formulation of quantum dy-
namics (e.g. by adding a “guiding” equation to the usual Schrödinger one). What
is the conceptual need that all these frameworks attempt to satisfy? The answer
seems crystal clear to us: to find a bridge that connects the quantum formalism
to the physical world (or with the “impression” of there being a physical world).
And, setting aside instrumentalist inclinations, the only reasonable way to estab-
lish such a link is by specifying an ontology for the theory.1 If we agree that this
is a cogent – although generic – characterization of what “interpreting” quantum
physics stands for, we immediately see that the need for an interpretation does
not arise just when we get to explain the behavior of a macroscopic measurement
apparatus, but it comes to light as soon as we ask “what is the picture of the phys-
ical world conveyed by the theory?”. Under this reading, to say that «decoherence
[...] brings with it no supplement to the physics [...] It introduces no new physical
principles, nor is it an interpretation» (Crull, 2014, p. 11) is misleading: deco-
herence and interpretation belong to different conceptual categories, and only an
interpretation can be predicated of “bringing no supplement to physics”, or “in-
troducing no new physical principles”. In short, by claiming that decoherence can
do a lot without interpretation, Crull is already presupposing a fair amount of in-
terpretation.
To see why decoherence needs an interpretation from the outset, let us consider,
for simplicity’s sake, the standard Schrödinger’s cat experimental setting. As the
author herself acknowledges (ibid., p. 15), the global decoherence process re-
mains entirely within the unitary Schrödinger evolution. Consequently, with what-
ever system – including whatever environment – the cat interacts, this interaction
will simply lead to more entanglement. Even if the standard is reduced from ac-
counting for a definite state of the cat to accounting for why the cat appears to be
in a definite state, decoherence as such does not do the job. Consider an observer
being coupled to the cat. Then the whole system will go into an entangled state
that is a superposition of “cat alive and live cat appearing to observer” and “cat
dead and dead cat appearing to observer”. In brief, because decoherence by no
means touches the fact that the state of the whole system is such a superposition
instead of one in which the observer is in a state of having definite appearances,
decoherence without an interpretation cannot even account for the appearance of
there being physical systems in definite states to observers.
1Of course, such a specification should not necessarily amount to bringing “classical terms”
into the equations, as suggested most notably by Bell (1987), but it could include the commitment
to irreducibly “non-classical” features of reality: Everett’s interpretation is a remarkable example,
in this sense.
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By contrast, Crull claims that decoherence alone explains why (a) the cat is ob-
served in a position eigenstate rather than, say, an energy one (problem of the
preferred basis), (b) the observation of, say, the “dead” part of the cat state is not
influenced by the “alive” part of the cat state (problem of the non-observability
of interference), and (c) the cat is observed either alive or dead (generic problem
of outcomes). As a matter of fact, we do not need to refer to observations in a
standard sense, here: if we agree that, once the cat state gets entangled with the
environment, the physical information encoded in the former is transferred in the
latter, then the above assertions can be cast in terms of environmental degrees of
freedom “recording” information about the cat qua quantum system. Even with
this further conceptual sophistication, our argument stands firm: if Crull wants
the decoherence mechanism to explain the assertions (a)-(c) she needs to make a
minimal set of assumptions, e.g., that (i) the cat is a quantum system completely
described by its own individual state - at least, before the decoherence process
takes place, (ii) there is something distinct from the cat, which we call “environ-
ment” - again, at least before decoherence, (iii) the physical information transfer
happens in virtue of the fact that (the states of) the cat and the environment stand
in a real physical relation we call “entanglement”,2 and that (iv) such an informa-
tion transfer gives rise to a state of affairs which is “non-classical” (e.g. there not
being a fact of the matter about whether the cat is definitely alive or dead). If we
explicitly drop (i)-(iv), we are left with no explanans whatsoever. Just to be clear:
we are not claiming that (i)-(iv) is the only possible interpretation compatible with
the decoherence mechanism,3 but that decoherence needs an interpretational back-
ground in order to make physical sense at all.
To make a concrete case, consider the claim that «[...] by pursuing the conse-
quences of quantum principles, we learn that it is a quantum feature of the world -
namely, the universality of entanglement and the decoherence processes resulting
therefrom - that gives rise to states of affairs that are empirically indistinguishable
from “classical” states of affairs» (ibid., pp. 12-13). It is now clear that such a
claim hides a huge amount of interpretational work: there is, in fact, no necessary
connection between the universality of entanglement (and the resulting decoher-
ence) and the rise of “non-classical” states of affairs. Evidently, to claim that the
universality of entanglement gives rise to “non-classical” or also “semi-classical”
states of affairs is pursuing the consequences of a certain interpretation. Nothing
prevents us from adopting a different interpretive framework such as, for example,
the formulation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory put forward in Dürr et al. (2013):
also this framework takes the universality of entanglement very seriously – and ac-
2This particular assumption is not as uncontroversial as it might seem. A quantum-Bayesianist,
for example, would tend to deny it.
3This is why we agree with the author that it is not the case that decoherence can be understood
only in an Everettian framework.
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commodates decoherence processes as well. Indeed, decoherence acquires a pre-
cise meaning in this context, and represents a key ingredient in the account of the
transition from quantum to classical trajectories of particles. But decoherence can
accomplish this task only against the background of a primitive ontology of there
being always a definite configuration of particles in spacetime. In other words,
decoherence is important to understand the link between the quantum formalism
and the classical world, but only on the basis of having settled for an ontology
of quantum physics in the first place. To sum up, we claim that Crull did not
make a case in favor of decoherence and against interpretation, but just defended
a particular brand of interpretation against others, based on the alleged fact that
the one proposed by her is the most parsimonious. Crull, despite her claims on the
contrary, is yet another gladiator battling in the interpretational arena of quantum
physics.
In conclusion, the moral we want to convey is simply that decoherence per se
does not do anything when it comes to establishing a connection between the
quantum formalism and the physical world (e.g. by accounting for definite states
of physical systems or the appearance of such states to observers), but decoher-
ence integrated in an interpretive framework does a good job to accomplish this
task. This is because it is the interpretive framework that sets the explanantes in
which decoherence enters, and hence decoherence alone cannot be said to explain
anything in a physically interesting sense. Once this fact is recognized, we totally
side with Crull in claiming that the quest for a quantum theory of gravity might
immensely benefit from the inclusion of decoherence mechanisms into it.
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